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Clinical and Epidemiologic
Characteristics of Smallpox
Smallpox is a viral disease unique to
humans. To sustain itself, the virus must pass
from person to person in a continuing chain of
infection and is spread by inhalation of air
droplets or aerosols. Twelve to 14 days after
infection, the patient typically becomes febrile
and has severe aching pains and prostration.
Some 2 to 3 days later, a papular rash develops
over the face and spreads to the extremities
(Figure 1). The rash soon becomes vesicular and
later, pustular (Figure 2). The patient remains
febrile throughout the evolution of the rash and
customarily experiences considerable pain as the
pustules grow and expand. Gradually, scabs
form, which eventually separate, leaving pitted
scars. Death usually occurs during the second
week.
The disease most commonly confused with
smallpox is chickenpox, and during the first 2 to
3 days of rash, it may be all but impossible to
distinguish between the two. However, all
smallpox lesions develop at the same pace and,
on any part of the body, appear identical.
Chickenpox lesions are much more superficial
and develop in crops. With chickenpox, scabs,
vesicles, and pustules may be seen simulta-
neously on adjacent areas of skin. Moreover, the
rash in chickenpox is more dense over the trunk
(the reverse of smallpox), and chickenpox lesions
are almost never found on the palms or soles.
In 5% to 10% of smallpox patients, more
rapidly progressive, malignant disease develops,
which is almost always fatal within 5 to 7 days. In
such patients, the lesions are so densely
confluent that the skin looks like crepe rubber;
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Figure 1. Most cases of smallpox are clinically typical
and readily able to be diagnosed.  Lesions on each area
of the body are at the same stage of development, are
deeply embedded in the skin, and are more densely
concentrated on the face and extremities.
Figure 2. The lesions of chickenpox develop as a
series of crops over several days and are very
superficial.  Papules, vesicles, pustules, and scabs
can be seen adjacent to each other.  The trunk is
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some patients exhibit bleeding into the skin and
intestinal tract. Such cases are difficult to
diagnose, but they are exceedingly infectious.
Smallpox spreads most readily during the
cool, dry winter months but can be transmitted
in any climate and in any part of the world. The
only weapons against the disease are vaccination
and patient isolation. Vaccination before
exposure or within 2 to 3 days after exposure
affords almost complete protection against
disease. Vaccination as late as 4 to 5 days after
exposure may protect against death. Because
smallpox can only be transmitted from the time
of the earliest appearance of rash, early detection
of cases and prompt vaccination of all contacts is
critical.
Smallpox Vaccination
Smallpox vaccination is associated with some
risk for adverse reactions; the two most serious
are postvaccinal encephalitis and progressive
vaccinia. Postvaccinal encephalitis occurs at a
rate of 3 per million primary vaccinees; 40% of
the cases are fatal, and some patients are left
with permanent neurologic damage. Progressive
vaccinia occurs among those who are immuno-
suppressed because of a congenital defect,
malignancy, radiation therapy, or AIDS. The
vaccinia virus simply continues to grow, and
unless these patients are treated with vaccinia
immune globulin, they may not recover.
Pustular material from the vaccination site may
also be transferred to other parts of the body,
sometimes with serious results.
Routine vaccination is only recommended for
laboratory staff who may be exposed to one of the
orthopoxviruses. There are two reasons for this.
First is the risk for complications. Second, U.S.
national vaccine stocks are sufficient to
immunize only 6 to 7 million persons. This
amount is only marginally sufficient for
emergency needs. Plans are now being made to
expand this reserve. However, at least 36 months
are required before large quantities can be
produced.
The potential of smallpox as a biological
weapon is most dramatically illustrated by two
European smallpox outbreaks in the 1970s. The
first occurred in Meschede, Germany, in 1970
(1). This outbreak illustrates that smallpox virus
in an aerosol suspension can spread widely and
infect at very low doses.
Another outbreak occurred in Yugoslavia in
February 1972 (1). Despite routine vaccination
in Yugoslavia, the first case in the 1972 outbreak
resulted in 11 others; those 11, on average, each
infected 13 more. Other outbreaks in Europe
from 1958 on showed that such explosive spread
was not unusual during the seasonal period of
high transmission, i.e., December through April.
One can only speculate on the probable rapidity
of spread of the smallpox virus in a population
where no one younger than 25 years of age has
ever been vaccinated and older persons have
little remaining residual immunity.
Where might the virus come from? At one
time, it was believed that the smallpox virus was
restricted to only two high-security laboratories,
one at the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention in Atlanta, Georgia, and one at the
Russian State Centre for Research on Virology
and Biotechnology, Koltsovo, Novosibirsk Re-
gion. By resolution of the 1996 World Health
Assembly (WHA), those stocks were slated to be
destroyed at the end of June 1999. The
desirability of such an action was reaffirmed by a
World Health Organization Expert Committee in
January 1999. On May 22, 1999, WHA, however,
passed a resolution postponing destruction until
2002, by which time any promise of the variola
virus stocks for public health research could be
determined.  Destruction of the virus would be at
least one step to limit the risk for the
reemergence of smallpox. However, despite
widespread acceptance of the 1972 Bioweapons
Convention Treaty, which called for all countries
to destroy their stocks of bioweapons and to cease
all research on offensive weapons, other
laboratories in Russia and perhaps in other
countries maintain the virus. Iraq and the Soviet
Union were signatories to the convention, as was
the United States. However, as reported by the
former deputy director of the Russian Bioweapons
Program, officials of the former Soviet Union
took notice of the worlds decision in 1980 to
cease smallpox vaccination, and in the atmo-
sphere of the cold war, they embarked on an
ambitious plan to produce smallpox virus in
large quantities and use it as a weapon. At least
two other laboratories in the former Soviet
Union are now reported to maintain smallpox
virus, and one may have the capacity to produce
the virus in tons at least monthly. Moreover,
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may have left Russia to sell their services to
rogue governments.
Smallpox is rated among the most dangerous
of all potential biological weapons, with far-
reaching ramifications.
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